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THE	  FOURTH	  PROBLEM	  
I.	  Bennett	  Capers	  *	  
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2012). Pp. 216. Hardcover $21.95.  
 
TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE (2013). Pp. 416. Hardcover $89.50. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
These days, to say there is a problem with the Fourth Amendment, the “most liti-
gated constitutional provision in the nation’s courts,”1 is to pretty much restate the obvi-
ous. Scholars have commented that the Fourth Amendment contains “both the virtue of 
brevity and the vice of ambiguity;”2 the “Fourth Amendment today is an embarrass-
ment;”3 and the “Fourth Amendment case law is a sinking ocean liner—rudderless and 
badly off course . . . .”4 There is even my own comment on the matter, which is compara-
tively mild: “our current Fourth Amendment jurisprudences is flawed.”5 This is to say 
nothing of the continuing debate over how to read the two clauses of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the first of which suggests a reasonableness requirement, and the latter of which 
speaks of the necessity of warrants.6 I refer to this as a debate, though the proponents ad-
vocating reasonableness as the guiding principle are clearly on the ascendancy.7 So 
again, the Fourth Amendment is a mess. To make matters worse, recent decisions, which 
purport to address some of these problems, in fact seem to compound them. Take United 
States v. Jones,8 which involved the use of a GPS tracking device to monitor a target’s 
                                                	   *	   Professor	  of	   Law,	  Brooklyn	  Law	  School.	  Assistant	  U.S.	  Attorney,	   Southern	  District	   of	  New	  York,	  1995-­‐2004.	  	  
 1.  TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE xi 
(2013). 
 2.  JACOB W LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42 (1966). 
 3.  Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 (1994). 
 4.  Id. at 759. 
 5.  I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 12 (2011). 
 6.  As the Court itself has acknowledged, its “jurisprudence [has] lurched back and forth between imposing 
a categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.” California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 
582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). For an overview of this debate, see JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. 
MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 157-64 (5th ed., 2010).  	   7.	  	   DRESSLER,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  163-­‐64.	  	   8.	  	   	  United	  States	  v.	  Jones,	  132	  S.	  Ct.	  945	  (2012).	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movement for thirty days. The Court reiterated its view that the Fourth Amendment pro-
vides no protection for activities conducted in public, but then reintroduced a ground for 
violation that scholars had long thought dead—trespass.9 
What are we to make of this state of affairs? What are we to do about this Fourth 
Amendment problem? The two books under review address this issue, but do so in de-
cidedly different ways. Stephen Schulhofer’s More Essential Than Ever: The Fourth 
Amendment in the Twenty-First Century10 takes a broad approach. Written for both a lay 
audience and the student of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it tackles a range of 
Fourth Amendment issues, from the origins of the Fourth Amendment to the challenges 
we face in balancing Fourth Amendment protections against national security interests.11 
Tracey Maclin’s The Supreme Court and the Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule,12 
as its title suggests, takes a more focused approach. Relying not just on Supreme Court 
opinions, but also on archival materials taken from the private papers of retired justices 
and conference notes, Maclin examines the evolution of the Court’s reliance on the ex-
clusionary rule as the primary remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation.13 Both books 
are persuasive and insightful. Each in its own way is even challenging. For this “student” 
of the Fourth Amendment, both books are rewarding. And maddening, too. I review each 
of them in turn below, beginning with an overview of some of their goals and then offer-
ing my own friendly amendments. 
I. THE ESSENTIAL FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 I have occasionally wondered what it would be like to begin my Criminal Proce-
dure classes with the story of John Wilkes. After reading Schulhofer’s More Essential 
Than Ever, I am wondering again. To be sure, the Wilkes14 case has much to recommend 
it, but I am thinking about it because Schulholfer, in one of his earliest chapters, tells the 
story in such a swashbuckling fashion.15 Consider the following passage in which he de-
scribes the events that lead up to the arrest of John Wilkes on seditious libel charges, a 
case that motivated much of the original thinking behind the drafting and ratification of 
the Fourth Amendment: 
 
In 1763, no longer willing to tolerate [the anonymous pamphlets de-
nouncing the government’s collection of taxes], Lord Halifax, the sec-
retary of state, issued a warrant ordering four king’s messengers “to 
make a strict & diligent search for the Authors, Printers & Publishers 
of a seditious and treasonable paper entitled, The North Briton Number 
45 [and] to apprehend & seize [them], together with their papers.” The 
messengers were indeed diligent. They arrested forty-nine individuals, 
                                                	   9.	  	   Id.	  at	  949-­‐50.	  	   10.	  	   STEPHEN	   J.	   SCHULHOFER,	  MORE	  ESSENTIAL	  THAN	  EVER:	   THE	   FOURTH	  AMENDMENT	   IN	   THE	  TWENTY-­‐FIRST	  CENTURY	  (2012).	  	   11.	  	   See	  generally	  id.	  	   12.	  	   MACLIN,	  supra	  note	  1.	  	   13.	  	   Id.	  	   14.	  	   Wilkes	  v.	  Wood,	  98	  Eng.	  Rep.	  489	  (C.P.	  1763).	  	  	   15.	  	   See SCHULHOFER,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  24-­‐26.	  
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss2/16
2013]	   THE	  FOURTH	  PROBLEM	   433	  
some in their beds, and often on the flimsiest justification. Dryden 
Leach, a printer, was seized in the middle of the night, together with all 
his papers, on the basis of nothing more than the fact that one of the 
messengers “had been told by a gentleman, who had been told by an-
other gentleman, that Leach’s people printed the paper in question.” 
Eventually, the messengers located the man who had printed The North 
Briton, No. 45, and learned that its author was Wilkes. They proceeded 
to arrest him, searched all his desk drawers, and seized all of his pa-
pers, including even his will.16 
 
This is riveting stuff. Reading this, I thought what a terrific movie this would 
make. Intrigue, suspense, the classic battle between might and right. I quote this passage 
at length not because the book dwells on the Wilkes case—the book devotes a few pages 
to it—but because it is representative of the book’s readability. Whether he is discussing 
run of the mill stop-and-frisks, or the Patriot Act’s expansion of federal authority to 
make delayed notice searches and the resulting miscarriage of justice in the case of 
Brandon Mayfield, a former military officer suspected of being a terrorist, Schulhofer 
renders this subject interesting. This, I know, may sound like a movie pitch, but Schulho-
fer makes the Fourth Amendment come to life. 
The book is also quite broad in its scope. After a chapter on the historical back-
ground (part of which included the Wilkes case) that informed the drafting and ratifica-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, Schulhofer announces a “jump roughly two hundred 
years forward”17 to discuss the contemporary, everyday world of searches and seizures 
(for example, the knock and announce rule and exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement for home searches) and of the policing of public spaces (for exam-
ple, the use of “consensual encounters” and Terry stops).18 There is a chapter on “special 
needs” searches (think airport security or the drug testing of government employees), a 
chapter on wiretapping in the information age, and a chapter devoted to the investigative 
tools given to the government in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks.19 The 
chapters are descriptive, but also critical, pointing out when and how the Court has com-
promised the Fourth Amendment to serve some other agenda, like strengthening the po-
lice in urban environments, and where the Court has conveniently sidestepped the Fourth 
Amendment’s history.20 Never pedantic, More Essential Than Ever nevertheless wears 
its politics on its sleeve. This is perhaps most obvious in Schulhoffer’s final chapter, 
which takes the Court’s originalists to task for their inconsistencies and presses what he 
terms “adaptive originalism,” a commitment “not to original rules but to original princi-
ples.”21 An example of this would be in the Court’s rejection, in Tennessee v. Garner,22 
                                                
 16.  Id. at 25. (internal citations omitted). 	   17.	  	   Id.	  at	  42.	  See	  also	  Terry	  v.	  Ohio,	  392	  U.S.	  1	  (1968)	  (holding	  that	  police	  may	  detain	  a	  person	  whom	  they	  reasonably	  believe	  was	  involved	  in	  criminal	  activity—now	  known	  as	  a	  Terry	  stop).	  	   18.	  	   See	  SCHULHOFER,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  42-­‐92.	  	   19.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  92-­‐180.	  	   20.	  	   Id.	  	  	   21.	  	   Id.	  at	  41,	  173-­‐77	  	   22.	  	   	  Tennessee	  v.	  Garner,	  471	  U.S.	  1	  (1985).	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of the common-law rule that permitted an officer to use deadly force in pursuing any fel-
on.23 Unfortunately, Garner stands as an outlier in the Court’s use of adaptive original-
ism. Schulhofer writes, “[t]he catch is that adaptation has almost always been a one-way 
street . . . . [The Court] rarely opts for adaptation when that approach would restrict po-
lice discretion.”24 
Still, I found the book maddening in parts. Imagine reading a book on a subject 
you know well, finding yourself thoroughly immersed in the book, and then suddenly 
coming across a description of a case and thinking, “Huh?” This happened to me several 
times. For example, consider his description of the facts in Terry v. Ohio,25 the case in 
which the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to the police practice commonly known as 
stop-and-frisk. Schulhofer writes that: 
 
A Cleveland police officer, on afternoon patrol in the downtown shop-
ping area, noticed a man walking back and forth in front of a store. 
Suspecting that the man might be “casing a stick-up,” the officer con-
fronted him, asked his name, and then quickly spun him around, patted 
his pockets, and recovered a pistol.26 
 
Schulhofer is speaking in shorthand, giving us the Cliff’s notes version of what 
happened in Terry, or, in keeping with the earlier movie idea, a Hollywood version of 
history where several characters are condensed into one. In fact, Detective McFadden 
(the detective in Terry) watched two men, first observing one walk to a store window, 
pause to look inside, and then proceeding to confer with the second man.27 Then he ob-
served the second man doing the same.28 As the opinion puts it, “[t]he two men repeated 
this ritual alternately between five and six times apiece—in all, roughly a dozen trips.”29 
At one point, the two men even conferred with a third man. After ten to twelve minutes 
of observation, Detective McFadden confronted and frisked all three men, finding a gun 
on two of them.30 While my concern about Shulhofer’s Cliff’s notes version may seem 
like nitpicking, to me it goes to the heart of what reasonable suspicion must mean. These 
details make the point that Detective McFadden did not simply stop and frisk the men for 
being black (a fact that is not mentioned in the Terry opinion, though it is hinted at) or 
because they “didn’t look right,”31 which seems to be the watered down standard that the 
New York City Police Department has been recently using, and which a federal district 
court recently found unconstitutional.32 Rather, Detective McFadden did “good police 
                                                	   23.	  	   387	  U.S.	  523	  (1967).	  23.	  	  SCHULHOFER,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  53-­‐54	  (citing	  Garner,	  471	  U.S.	  1);	  id.	  at	  95-­‐100	  (citing	  Camara	  v.	  Mun.	  Court	  of	  S.F.,	  387	  U.S.	  523	  (1967)).	  	   24.	  	   SCHULHOFER,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  174.	  	   25.	  	   	  See	  generally	  Terry	  v.	  Ohio,	  392	  U.S.	  1	  (1968).	  	   26.	  	   SCHULHOFER,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  75.	  	   27.	  	   Terry	  v.	  Ohio,	  392	  U.S.	  1,	  6	  (1968).	  	   28.	  	   Id.	  at	  5-­‐6.	  	   29.	  	   Id.	  at	  6.	  	   30.	  	   Id.	  at	  6-­‐7.	  	   31.	  	   Id.	  at	  5.	  	   32.	  	   Floyd	   v.	   City	   of	  New	  York,	  No.	   08	   Civ.	   1034,	   2013	  WL	   4046209,	   at	   *1	   (S.D.N.Y.	   Aug.	   12,	   2013)	  (finding	  New	  York	  City’s	  stop	  and	  frisk	  practices	  violated	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment).	  See	  Hon.	  Louis	  Stokes,	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work.”33 This difference matters.34 
Or at least this difference mattered to me, but perhaps that is because I have spent 
so much time thinking about Terry and its progeny in particular. In fact, the time I have 
spent writing and teaching about the Fourth Amendment may explain why I found my-
self wanting more in other sections of the book, too. As an example of the Court’s 
“strong commitment to the traditional requirement of prior judicial approval for intru-
sions into the home,” and of the Court remaining “faithful to our original Fourth 
Amendment tradition when the privacy of a domicile is at stake,”35 Schulhofer discusses 
the case Minnesota v. Olsen, in which the Court held an arrest warrant was necessary to 
arrest an overnight guest in a third party’s home.36 But this discussion seemed incom-
plete without some mention of New York v. Harris,37 which basically says, “ah, yes, 
there should have been a warrant, but the arrest is still good.” Or consider his discussion 
of the much-maligned third-party doctrine,38 which essentially holds that a person cannot 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy with information she shares with a third party. 
Schulhofer makes the argument that “Fourth Amendment safeguards should apply when-
ever individuals convey personal information to a service provider or other intermediate 
institution under promise of confidentiality.”39 I completely agree. But still, I wanted 
Schulhofer to discuss how his solution would address a related doctrine, that of “false 
friends”,40 which, aside from being problematic in its own right, would seem to conflict 
                                                                                                                    
Representing	   John	  W.	  Terry,	   72	  ST.	   JOHN’S	  L.	  REV.	  727,	  729	   (1998).	  For	  an	  argument	   tracing	   the	  Court’s	  insensitivity	  to	  racial	  targeting	  to	  the	  Court’s	  tactical	  decision	  to	  minimize	  the	  issue	  of	  race	  in	  Terry,	  see	  Anthony	  C.	  Thompson,	  Stopping	  the	  Usual	  Suspects:	  Race	  and	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment,	  74	  N.Y.U.	  L.	  REV.	  956	  (1999).	  	   33.	  	   This	   is	  a	  point	   I	  make	   in	  a	  recent	  New	  York	  Times	  op-­‐ed.	  See	   I.	  Bennett	  Capers,	  Moving	  Beyond	  
Stop-­‐and-­‐Frisk,	   N.Y.	   TIMES,	   Aug.	   12,	   2013,	   http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/opinion/moving-­‐beyond-­‐stop-­‐and-­‐frisk.html?_r=0.	  	   34.	  	   Another	  place	  where	   this	   irked	  me	  was	   in	  Schulhofer’s	  description	  of	  Whren	  v.	  United	  States,	   in	  which	   the	  Court	   green-­‐lighted	   the	  practice	   of	   pretextual	   police	   stops.	   517	  U.S.	   806	   (1996).	   Schulhofer	  writes	  that	  the	  police	  pulled	  Whren	  over	  for	  making	  a	  turn	  without	  signaling,	  and	  then	  arrested	  him	  for	  that	  offense.	   Id.	  at	  808.	  The	  search-­‐incident	   to	  arrest	  authority	  then	  permitted	  the	  police	  to	  search	  the	  area	  within	  his	  reach,	  which	  turned	  up	  two	  plastic	  bags	  of	  cocaine.	  SCHULHOFER,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  61.	  The	  Court	  opinion,	  however,	  describes	  the	   facts	  very	  differently.	  After	  Whren	  committed	  a	  traffic	  violation,	  two	   police	   officers	   signaled	  Whren	   to	   pull	   over.	  Whren,	   517	   U.S.	   at	   808.	  One	   of	   the	   officers	   then	   ap-­‐proached	  the	  driver’s	  window,	  and	  “immediately	  observed	  two	  large	  plastic	  bags	  of	  what	  appeared	  to	  be	  crack	  cocaine	  in	  petitioner	  Whren’s	  hands.”	  Id.	  at	  808-­‐09.	  Again,	  the	  facts	  matter,	  if	  for	  no	  other	  reason	  than	  they	  suggest	  the	  improbability	  of	  the	  officers’	  version	  of	  the	  events	  and	  the	  likelihood	  that	  they	  in	  fact	  engaged	  in	  “testilying.”	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  both	  officers	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  misconduct	  alle-­‐gations,	  including	  allegations	  of	  planting	  evidence	  and	  providing	  false	  testimony.	  See	  generally	  Kevin	  R.	  Johnson,	  The	  Song	  Remains	  the	  Same:	  The	  Story	  of	  Whren	  v.	  United	  States,	  in	  RACE	  LAW	  STORIES	  (Rachel	  F.	  Moran	  &	  Devon	  Wayne	  Carbado	  eds.,	  2008);	  Tracey	  Maclin,	  Race	  and	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment,	  51	  VAND.	  L.	  REV.	   333	   (1998).	   	   On	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   term	   “testilying”	   and	   its	   pervasiveness,	   see	   I.	   Bennett	   Capers,	  
Crime,	  Legitimacy,	  and	  Testilying,	  83	  IND.	  L.J.	  835	  (2008).	  	   35.	  	   SCHULHOFER,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  50.	  
 36.  Id. (discussing Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)).  
 37. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
 38.  SCHULHOFER, supra note 10, at 126-34. 
 39.  Id. at 134. 
 40.  The “false friends” doctrine is traceable to Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1967) and United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). The doctrine stands for the proposition that, when a person enters into a 
conversation, he assumes the risk that the listener may report the conversation to a police officer, or that the 
listener may record the conversation. As such, there can be no legitimate expectation of privacy in conversa-
tions with others. The doctrine is interesting because it seems, on its face, inconsistent with the Court’s holding 
in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), in which the Court held that one does have a reasonable expecta-
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with his solution.41 And when Schulhofer asserts, during his discussion of eavesdropping 
in the information age, that the “major aim of the Fourth Amendment—
unquestionably—is . . . to afford shelter to political, religious, and ideological minori-
ties,”42 I again want more. The Framers, after all, were insiders, not outsiders, and their 
interests seemed more aligned with this than anything else. After all, going back to the 
man who “inspired” the Fourth Amendment, John Wilkes, one senses that he represented 
the silent majority, not an ideological minority.43 And how exactly does this claimed no-
tion of protecting “political, religious, and ideological minorities” square with the rather 
majoritarian-sounding requirement that the Fourth Amendment only applies where there 
is an expectation of privacy “that society is prepared to recognized as reasonable”?44 
II. THE WANING EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
While Schulhofer’s More Essential Than Ever provides the big picture, Maclin’s 
The Supreme Court and the Exclusionary Rule zooms in to focus exclusively on exclu-
sion as a Fourth Amendment remedy.45 Every student of criminal procedure, and hope-
fully every criminal litigator, is familiar with Mapp v. Ohio,46 the case that ushered in the 
Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution and made the exclusionary rule binding on 
the states. In short, the “rule” is that if the police obtain evidence in violation of a de-
fendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures, the 
primary remedy is that the evidence will be excluded at trial.47 Similarly, students of 
criminal procedure and criminal litigators are familiar with United States v. Leon,48 in 
which the Court embraced a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule: evidence 
obtained by police acting in good faith reliance on a search warrant issued by a judge, 
but later determined to be unsupported by probable cause, will not be excluded. Also fa-
miliar to many is the Supreme Court’s latest major extension of the good faith exception 
in Herring v. United States.49 Now, even evidence resulting from police reliance on neg-
ligent—even incompetent—actions taken by police departments themselves will not war-
rant exclusion, so long as the initial reliance was in good faith. 
While these seminal cases are familiar to many, the build up to them is not. 
                                                                                                                    
tion of privacy in conversations intended to be private where there is no “invited ear” that subsequently reports 
the conversation. As Stephen Saltzburg and Dan Capra rhetorically put it, “[w]hy does a person assume the risk 
that a friend will record an incriminating conversation, but not the risk that the government will use a wiretap 
and record an incriminating conversation?” STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 475 (7th ed. 2004). The inconsistency becomes more glar-
ing when one considers Title III requirements, as I do in an earlier article. See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Sur-
veillance, and Communities, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959, 971-74 (2013). 	   41.	  	   See Capers, supra note 40, at 971-74. 	   42.	  	   SCHULHOFER,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  141.	  	   43.	  	  	  See	  generally	  Wilkes	  v.	  Wood,	  98	  Eng.	  Rep.	  489	  (C.P.	  1763).	  	   44.	  	   Katz	  v.	  United	  States,	  389	  U.S.	  347,	  361	  (1967)	  (Harlan,	  J.,	  concurring)	  (emphasis	  added).	  	   45.	  	   Returning	   to	   the	   earlier	  movie	   comparison,	   if	  More	  Essential	   Than	  Ever	   is	   like	   a	   big	  Hollywood	  historical	  blockbuster—think	  Lincoln—then	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment’s	  Exclusion-­‐
ary	  Rule	   is	  more	   like	  an	  eight-­‐part	  PBS	  documentary.	  See	  SCHULHOFER,	  supra	  note	  10;	  LINCOLN	   (Dream-­‐Works	  2012);	  MACLIN,	  supra	  note	  1.	  	   46.	  	   See	  generally	  Mapp	  v.	  Ohio,	  	  367	  U.S.	  643	  (1961).	  	   47.	  	   	  Id.	  	   48.	  	   See	  generally	  United	  States	  v.	  Leon,	  	  468	  U.S.	  897	  (1984).	  	   49.	  	   See	  generally	  Herring	  v.	  United	  States,	  	  555	  U.S.	  135	  (2009).	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Maclin’s book, in wonderful detail and heavily footnoted, completes the picture of these 
cases, as well as the many cases that preceded and informed them.50 As Maclin notes in 
his Introduction, Court opinions “often do not reveal the ‘motivations’ behind the results 
announced by the Court.”51 To get at these motivations, Maclin plumbs the private pa-
pers of retired Justices, the briefs filed by lawyers, the conference notes of the Justices, 
earlier drafts of published opinions, as well as law clerk memos. For the reader who 
wants a play-by-play examination of the rise and fall of the exclusionary rule and the be-
hind the scenes machinations along the way, this is a terrific book. 
Maclin begins with Boyd v. United States and Weeks v. United States, the two early 
cases that established the foundations of the exclusionary rule, at least in federal prosecu-
tions.52 He follows with a chapter titled “The Influence of Felix Frankfurter”, which has 
as its centerpiece the Court’s decision in Wolf v. Colorado, in which the Court declined 
to make the exclusionary rule binding on the states.53 Although this part of Wolf was 
eventually overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, Maclin joins other scholars in noting that Wolf 
remains significant in important respects.54 One, Wolf injects deterrence as the primary 
rationale for the exclusionary rule.55 Two, Wolf marks the first occasion where the Court 
uncoupled the exclusionary rule from the Fourth Amendment.56 And perhaps more im-
portantly, by uncoupling the exclusionary rule from the Fourth Amendment, Wolf 
“showed future justices how to restrict the exclusionary rule without appearing to abolish 
the rule itself [and] ‘planted the seeds of destruction for the exclusionary rule—in federal 
as well as state cases.’”57 In short, if the exclusionary rule is now a “last resort, not our 
first impulse,”58 as the current Court claims, it is in part because of Wolf’s language. 
Maclin’s description of the evolution of the exclusionary rule becomes more inter-
esting when he gets to the Warren Court and Mapp v. Ohio.59 As Maclin does throughout 
the book, he sets the stage with a few facts of the case, but these facts are quickly fol-
lowed by the real action: the background strategizing and horse-trading of the justices, 
the tense conference discussions, the circulated draft opinions and edits, and compromis-
es to win votes.60 Maclin persuasively shows how the compromises in Mapp set its own 
stage, in this case for its demise. For example, Justice Clark’s opinion speaks of the ex-
                                                	   50.	  	  	  	  See	  generally	  MACLIN,	  supra	  note	  1.	  	   51.	  	   Id. at xiv.  	   52.	  	  	  	  See	   generally	   Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 
(1886).	  	   53.	  	  	  	  	  See	  generally	  Wolf	  v.	  Colorado,	  338 U.S. 25 (1949); MACLIN,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  29.	  	   54.	  	  	  	  	  See	  generally	  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);	  MACLIN,	  supra	  note	  1.	  	  
 55.  Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31. 
 56.  MACLIN, supra note 1, at 30. For example, this uncoupling was taken up in Leon v. United States, 
which stated: “Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case, our decisions 
make clear, is ‘an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking 
to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.’” Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) ( quoting 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983)). 
 57.  MACLIN, supra note 1, at 30-31 (quoting Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule 
Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather than an “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 616 
(1983)). 
 58.  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 
(2006)). 
 59.  See generally Mapp,  367 U.S. 643. 	   60.	   See	  generally	  MACLIN,	  supra	  note	  1.	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clusionary rule being “judicially implied” and a “deterrent safeguard,” language that was 
inserted late in the drafting process.61 As Maclin puts it, by relying on deterrence to justi-
fy exclusion, “Clark constructed the exclusionary rule’s eventual demise.”62 Later, 
Maclin is even more blunt: “the Burger and Rehnquist Courts would use [Clark’s] de-
scription on the purpose of the rule as a bludgeon to destroy the constitutional foundation 
of Mapp.”63 
Both Burger and Rehnquist vehemently opposed the exclusionary rule,64 and were 
crucial in weakening its reach. Although the Court had read the exclusionary rule as ex-
tending to all fruits of the violation—in short, the fruit-of-the-poisonous tree exclusion—
we see the build up to the attenuation exception in Wong Sun v. United States,65 which 
rejected the “but-for” test for exclusion and instead permitted the admission at trial of 
fruits of a Fourth Amendment violation, so long as the evidence was obtained “by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”66 We see the early at-
tempts to adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in cases such as Illinois v. 
Gates, which was eventually decided on other grounds, and then its successful adoption 
in United States v. Leon, with language both narrow and broad.67 And we see the em-
brace of the “independent source” and “inevitable discovery” exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule as well.68 Lastly, in a chapter titled “The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts: 
Making the Exclusionary Rule Largely Irrelevant”, Maclin takes us through the more re-
cent assaults on exclusion through cases such as New York v. Harris (essentially green-
lighting warrantless arrests in the home), Hudson v. Michigan (essentially green-lighting 
the practice of ignoring the knock-and-announce requirement), and perhaps most assaul-
tive of all, Herring v. United States, which, as Maclin observes, reflects the Roberts 
Court’s intention to “either abolish the [exclusionary] rule or confine it to cases of egre-
gious Fourth Amendment violations.”69 
Nor is the book limited to the exclusionary rule. Indeed, some of the strongest parts 
                                                
 61.  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)); 
MACLIN, supra note 1, at 97. 
 62.  MACLIN, supra note 1, at 98. 
 63.  Id. at 99. 
 64.  Burger, at one point, claimed he only wanted to “trim” the exclusionary rule. Id. at 286. However, he 
did more than trim it, and repeatedly criticized the rule, in one speech even complaining that, “[w]e afford the 
accused more procedural protections, such as the exclusion and suppression of evidence and the dismissal of 
cases for irregularities in the arrests and searches, than under any other system.” Warren E. Burger, Paradoxes 
in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 58 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 428, 429 (1967). For his part, 
Rehnquist wrote in one memo, “[w]hatever may be the arguments for and against this particular limitation on 
the Exclusionary Rule, my disagreement with Mapp v. Ohio remains so fundamental that I will seize any op-
portunity to limit the damage done by that case.” MACLIN, supra note 1, at 267 (internal citations omitted). 
 65.  Wong Sun v. United States,  371 U.S 471 (1963). 
 66.  Id. at 488. 
 67.  See generally Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Alt-
hough on its face, Leon was limited to cases involving police reliance on judicial warrants later declared to be 
ineffective, its language is in part broad enough to encompass other “good faith” mistakes.   	   68.	   See	  generally	  Leon,	  468	  U.S.	  at	  897.	  	  	   69.	  	   See	  generally	  Hudson	  v.	  Michigan,	  547	  U.S.	  586	  (2006);	  New	  York	  v.	  Harris,	  495	  U.S.	  14	  (1990).	  
See	  also	  Herring	  v.	  United	  States,	  555	  U.S.	  135,	  144	  (2009)	  (holding	  that	  to	  “trigger	  the	  exclusionary	  rule,	  police	  conduct	  must	  be	  sufficiently	  deliberate	   that	  exclusion	  can	  meaningfully	  deter	   it,	  and	  sufficiently	  culpable	  that	  such	  deterrence	  is	  worth	  the	  price	  paid	  by	  the	  justice	  system.”	  The	  Court	  concluded	  that	  an	  officer’s	  arrest	  of	  Herring,	  based	  on	  arrest	  warrant	  that	  another	  police	  employee	  had	  failed	  to	  vacate,	  did	  not	  rise	  to	  such	  a	  level);	  MACLIN,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  336.	  
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss2/16
2013]	   THE	  FOURTH	  PROBLEM	   439	  
of the book involved inconsistency in the Justices’ insistence on limiting the exclusion-
ary rule to instances where it can deter egregious police misconduct (though proving de-
terrence is notoriously difficult),70 and their narrow views about Fourth Amendment 
standing.71 Because the Court deems Fourth Amendment violations personal—only a 
person who has a reasonable expectation of privacy can claim his rights were violat-
ed72—it is now perfectly fine for the Government to deliberately violate the rights of one 
individual to secure evidence to use against another.73 This is in fact what happened in 
United States v. Payner,74 where the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), without a war-
rant, broke into the briefcase of a target’s lawyer to uncover information that led to 
Payner, who was subsequently convicted. The Court’s concern with deterrence was sud-
denly irrelevant. The IRS may have acted in bad faith and may even have acted egre-
giously, but since it did not violate Payner’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the reme-
dy of exclusion was inapplicable.75 
Of course, this overview only begins to give a sense of the breadth and encyclope-
dic detail of the book. The book examines not just the seminal exclusionary cases, but 
the minor ones as well. It also describes the fits, starts, and the near misses. An example 
of this can be found in the chapter on the “good faith” exception.76 The chapter ends with 
a discussion of New Jersey v. T.L.O., and the issue that initially concerned the Justices: 
whether the exclusionary rule should apply in a juvenile delinquency proceeding to bar 
evidence acquired by a school official.77 Maclin uses several pages to take the reader 
through the oral argument, through the conference discussion, through the draft opinions, 
and through a second conference and a second re-argument.78 Ultimately, of course, the 
Court decided not to address the issue of exclusion, focusing instead on whether the 
school official’s search was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
It is this level of detail which makes the book so rewarding, and at the same time 
maddening. Although Maclin’s point of view is made clear throughout the book, he is 
almost too methodological in his delivery. I could not help but wonder throughout how 
much more impactful the book might be if he had begun with, say, Herring, the most re-
cent and potentially far-reaching blow to the exclusionary rule, and then jumped back to 
the beginning. I wondered, too, if in the discussion of every major case, we did not have 
to go through the same routine: bare-boned facts, then a recitation of each Justice’s 
statement at the conference discussion, then the arguments over the draft opinions. For 
me, neither a professional nor amateur historian, it was sometimes too much information, 
or at least too methodically delivered. 
Maddening, too, was the absence of Maclin’s own thoughts on how to revive the 
                                                	   70.	  	   Among	  other	  things,	  deterrence	  is	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  prove	  empirically.	  	   71.	  	   See	  generally	  	  MACLIN,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  35-­‐36,	  217-­‐25,	  229-­‐30.	  	   72.	  	   See	  generally	  	  Rakas	  v.	  Illinois,	  439	  U.S.	  128	  (1978).	  	   73.	  	   The	  first	  individual	  may	  have	  a	  civil	  remedy.	  However,	  what	  matters	  is	  that	  the	  second	  individu-­‐al—the	  target	  of	  the	  investigation—will	  not	  have	  any	  remedy,	  civil	  or	  exclusion,	  at	  all.	  	   74.	  	   See	  United	  States	  v.	  Payner,	  	  447	  U.S.	  727	  (1980).	  	   75.	   Id.	  	   76.	   See	  generally	  MACLIN,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  231.	  
 77. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985);  MACLIN, supra note 1, at 266. 
 78.  See	  MACLIN,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  264-­‐73.  
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exclusionary rule, or for that matter how to revive and/or strengthen some other remedy 
such as the civil penalties that were available to John Wilkes. The Supreme Court and 
the Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule is remarkable in its detail and in showing us 
where we have been, where we are, and where we seem to be heading. However, there is 
very little by way of a roadmap suggesting an alternative course. I found myself wishing 
for a type of long-term planning and strategizing on par with the planning by conserva-
tives to neutralize the exclusionary rule. Speaking more broadly, I could say the same 
thing about Schulhofer’s More Essential Than Ever. We know the Fourth Amendment is 
a mess. But how, specifically, do we fix it? 
CONCLUSION 
My review of More Essential Than Ever and The Supreme Court and the Fourth 
Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule has been critical, but let me be absolutely clear: these 
are both terrific books. They are both well written and informative, and I wish I could 
sing their praises more. In short, though I have leveled some criticisms, these criticisms 
are minor compared to the books’ strengths. And here is the important thing: the individ-
ual who reads them will find them enriching. This reader was enriched by both. 
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